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Este artigo analiza os fatores de instabilização inerentes à integração de sistemas 
financeiros de distintos tamanho, profundidade e dinâmica de crescimento, à luz da 
recente experiência (anos 90) da integração financeira entre América Latina e economias 
maduras. 
 






In the last two decades financial integration between Latin American economies and 
mature economies has been significant and traumatic, as it has been highly associated 
with macroeconomic instability, poor growth performance and often with domestic 
financial crises. Some analysts have blamed the volatility of capital flows for such 
perverse association, while others (mainly mainstream economists) center their criticisms 
on the inconsistent domestic policies and lack of appropriate financial regulation and 
supervision in domestic Latin American economies. This paper claims this debate is 
missing the main issues behind such instability; these are (i) financial integration of Latin 
American economies in the 1990s has been the “integration of uneven partners”, that is 
the integration of rapidly expanding capital-market based systems with relatively stagnant 
bank-based systems. (ii) The consequences of such integration is destabilizing due to the 
volume, type and volatility of capital flows, vis-à-vis the size of and capacity of Latin 
American domestic financial markets to absorb such flows.  
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I. Introduction 
 
In the second half of 1980s and throughout the first half of the 1990s, there was a spectacular 
growth of financial markets in the developed economies. This growth was soon followed by a 
significant surge of capital flows from mature economies to developing countries. In special, 
in Latin America the opening of capital account (in the context of liberalising policies of the 
end of 1980s and beginning of the 1990s) led to a very significant surge of voluntary foreign 
capital inflows. These flows had strong destabilising effects on key economic variables, such 
as exchange rates, domestic supply of credit and domestic asset prices – soon followed by 
significant macro and financial imbalance. This paper claims that to some this instability was 
originated by the abrupt and careless integration of two financial markets of quite distinct 
structure, size, depth and pace of growth. Even though the international financial 
environment and the policy regimes did have an important role in creating the macro and 
financial imbalances of the 1990s in Latin America, here we want to focus on the "domestic 
financial channels" - that is, the links between surges of financial capital in the context of a 
bank-based financial system with shallow credit and securities markets and of highly 
unstable growth performance.  
 
The paper is structure in four parts in addition to this introduction. Section II contrasts the 
distinct structural features and pace of development of financial systems of developed and 
Latin American economies in the 1980s. Section III presents a theoretical account of the 
transmission channels of surges of capital inflows into a bank-based developing economy, 
focusing  on the domestic financial channels - on which we want to focus our analysis 
here. Section IV discusses, in the light of the analysis in the three previous sections, the 
impacts of the above-mentioned surges on macroeconomic perfornance and financial 
stability in the region. Section V summarises our findings and presents our conclusions. 
 
II. Uneven  partners 
 
Financial systems in a number of key mature economies (especially the US) changed 
dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s, as a consequence of domestic deregulation and 
external financial liberalization.
 1  At least four strong trends are observed.  
 
First, a well-known process of desintermediation occurred: the traditional banking 
institutions were transformed into new financial services firms - including those of 
institutional securities firms, insurance companies, and asset managers. In addition non-
bank financial institutions - such as mutual funds, investment banks, pension funds, and 
insurance companies – began actively competing with banks both on the asset and 
liability sides of banks’ balance sheets. Second, the deregulation and growth of 
                                                 
1 For more detailed description of the changes in the financial systems of mature economies, see 
inter alia BIS (1986), Franklin (1993), Feeney (1994),  Helleiner (1994), Bloomenstein (1995) 
and Group of 10 (2001). 
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institutional investors – in special pension funds and insurance companies – have made 
their role in the provision of loanable funds more prominent. Finally external 
liberalization and significant improvements in information technology have increased 
across-the-border dealings of securities, and internationalization of the financial business.  
 
The mere fact that new financially “heavy weight” agents (investment banks, mutual 
funds and institutional investors) were allowed to expand their securities trading led to a 
rapid growth of prices in the secondary markets. This created a virtuous circle of 
expansion of asset prices and markets: as financial wealth increased, investors’ 
expectations were fulfilled, leading to further rounds of financial investment.  Not 
surprisingly, the total financial assets in the hands of institutional investors almost tripled 
from 1987 to 1990, and again almost doubled from 1990 to 1996 (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 - Financial assets in the hand of institutional investors in selected OECD 
economies 
 
1987 1990 1993 1996 1987 1990 1993 1996
USA 770 1069 2075 3539 USA 1095 1900 2422 3052
Japan 305 336 455 420 Japan 271 1067 1620 1956
Gemany 42 72 79 124 Gemany 155 401 452 692
France 204 379 484 529 France 74 239 363 582
United Kingdom 68 89 131 188 United King 190 454 667 792
Other OECD 161 184 517 533 Other OEC 180 565 645 908
Subtotal 1550 2129 3741 5333 Subtotal 1965 4626 6169 7982
1987 1990 1993 1996 1987 1990 1993 1996
United States 1606 2492 3449 4752 United Stat 3471 5461 7946 11343
Japan 0 0 0 0 Japan 576 1403 2075 2376
Gemany 22 52 47 65 Gemany 219 525 578 881
France 0 0 0 0 France 278 618 847 1111
United Kingdom 224 537 682 897 United King 482 1080 1480 1877
Other OECD 287 612 668 886 Other OEC 628 1361 1830 2327
Subtotal 2139 3693 4846 6600 TOTAL 5654 10448 14756 19915
Investment companies Insurance companies
Pension Funds Total
Source: BIS (1998: 76-97). Data consolidated by the author. 
 
In addition, evidenced by Fornari and Levy (1999) the gross financial assets of the G6 
doubled as a proportion of GDP between 1980 and 1994, whereas the liquidity of these assets 
increased substantially.
2 Just to give a measure of this trend, from 1989 to 1993, the 
                                                 
2 This process would probably end up in a tradition Mynskian asset crisis (Minsky, 1982; Taylor 
and Oconnel, 1985), were it not for the characteristics of the financial markets in some mature 
economies – in special, the US financial markets. This characteristic has to do with the 
significant side and depth of securities markets and the strong link between secondary and 
primary markets. The result of this link was that the growth of capital markets provided new 
sources of finance to the corporate sector (for instance, the IT sector, “dot.com” companies and 
so on), a trend that has been highly leveraged by the use of financial derivatives to unbundle risks 
and securitize. This provided the financing required for the technological revolution and 
productivity expansion which in turn permitted the astonishing growth of the US “new economy” 
in the 1990s.  
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Outstanding amounts of debt securities issued in  OECD economies increased over US$ 6 
trillion, and more than doubled from 1989 to 2000 (Table 2).  
 
 
Table 2 - Outstanding amounts of debt securities issued in domestic 
markets (US$ billions and %) 
 
Year 1989 1993 1997 2000 1989 1993 1997 2000
All issuers 14042.4 20564.7 25464 29732.9 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
OECD 13558.7 19966.7 24452.4 28579.9 96.6% 97.1% 96.0% 96.1%
United States 6682.8 9226.7 12059 14545.9 47.6% 44.9% 47.4% 48.9%
Japan 2626.7 4010.1 4399.3 6072.3 18.7% 19.5% 17.3% 20.4%
France 557.6 995.7 1102.5 1068.1 4.0% 4.8% 4.3% 3.6%
Germany 668.4 1458.4 1732.1 1711.6 4.8% 7.1% 6.8% 5.8%
UK 332.9 446.1 777.7 895.9 2.4% 2.2% 3.1% 3.0%
Latin America 172.1 296.7 490.6 482.8 1.2% 1.4% 1.9% 1.6%
Argentina 113.5 39 70.1 85.2 0.8% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3%
Brazil - 189.9 344.5 292.5 - 0.9% 1.4% 1.0%
Chile 7.5 19.2 36.5 34.2 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Mexico 51.1 47.9 37.6 67.3 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2%
Peru - 0.7 1.9 3.6 - 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
US$ Bi % of total
 
Source: BIS database; consolidated and ellaborated by the author. 
 
The surge of capital flows to developing economies in the 1990s is directly associated 
with the process described above. First of all, the rapid growth of financial wealth in the 
hands of private financial investors increased the demand for “risk diversification”. This 
explains in a great extent the expansion of a variety of specialized securities markets in 
mature economies - especially in the US -, from investment asset-based securities (for 
instance, mortgage-based securities) to junk bonds. This search for risk diversification 
also explains a great deal of the expansion of across-the-border securities dealings, and 
the development of foreign-asset based securities (such as ADRs and GDRs) in the 
“international” markets - as for instance happened with the asset-based securities issued 
in securities markets (graph 1). 
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Source: BIS (1998: 43). 
 
Similarly to what happened in developed economies, but in a much smaller scale, Latin 
American financial markets increased substantially in the 1990s - as is evidenced by 
Table 2 above.  
 
However, in contrast to what happened in developed economies, and like in most 
developing economies (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine and Maksimovic 2000), Latin 
American financial systems in the early-1990s continue to suffer from the similar 
structural problems as those described by Raymond Goldsmith (1969) in the 1960s:
3 (a) 
the banking sector remained relatively small (Graph 1),
4 lending relatively little and 
concentrating its operations in short term activities, including the refinancing of 
government debt, and is highly vulnerable to external shocks; (b) the supply of loanable 
funds to specific sectors continued to be highly rationed.
5 This implies that credit 
market is supply-constrained for many sectors, and these expenditures tend to be highly 
sensitive to changes in the supply of loanable funds; (c) net interest margins in the 
banking sector are still much higher than those found in developed economies 
(Graph 2), an indication of very high spreads, leading to non-competitive financial costs 
to the domestic corporate sectors and high levels of self-finance (which is a deterrent to 
economic expansion);
6  (d)  securities markets remained small  (graph 3), and the 
                                                 
3 As a matter of fact they continue to suffer from these problems to this date. 
4 In the graphs below (from 1 to 3)  the circles comprise a significant part of Latin American 
economies of our sample, as an indication of the comparative stage of development of financial 
systems in the region viz-a-viz mature economies and even some developing economies. 
5 In special to popular house financing, SME and poor consumers and long-term productive 
investments. 
6 Even though it is possible to reduce such spreads through specific policies, as the recent 
Brazilian experience shows (BCB, 2000), these spreads seem to be highly related to the 
shallowness of credit markets in developing economies as indicated by Graph 2 below.  
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Graph 1 – Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks to GDP - selected developed and 
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Source: World Bank. Elaborated by the author.  
DPC = Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks to GDP. 
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Source: World Bank. Elaborated by the author. IM = Net Interest Margin (%). 
 
                                                 
7 In Latin America, the external financial opening and domestic financial deregulation did change 
some microeconomic structural problems. But the structural problems described above remained 
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine and Maksimovic 2000). This is not surprising: as discussed in 
Studart (2000), overcoming these structural problems requires long-term financial and 
institution-building policies.  
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Graph 3 – Some indicators of the size of securities in selected developed and 
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Source: World Bank. Elaborated by the author. 
CAP = Stock market capitalization to GDP 
 
In the late-1980s Latin American economies opened up their capital accounts and their 
domestic financial markets to foreign investors. Given the characteristics of Latin 
American financial systems (vis-à-vis those of the US economies), the microeconomic 
incentives for portfolio investors in investing in some Latin American financial markets 
and domestic financial institutions and large corporations issuing became quite significant 
– as we will see below. This microeconomically rational behavior was, to a great extent, 
the main source of the process of increasing macro-financial vulnerability and instability 
in the region in the 1990s.  
 
In order to understand why this integration was destabilizing, we must depict how this 
surges of capital flows affected key macro and financial variables in Latin American 
economies. This is our next topic. 
III. A stylized transmission mechanism 
 
All developing economies are soft-currency economies,
8 so that it is fair to assume that 
surges of financial flows affect their performance depending on:  
!  the international financial environment - the volume of these flows in relation to the 
size of the economy and their volatility;  
!  policy regimes - the exchange-rate, trade, monetary and fiscal policy regimes "chosen" 
by the specific economy;  
                                                 
8 The fact that some developing economies adopt hard-currencies as their means of payments 
(such as in the recent processes of dollarization) do not make them “hard-currency economies”, 
due to the fact that their monetary authorities cannot issue the hard-currency adopted. On this see 
Studart (2001).  
  8 
!  domestic financial channels:  
"  structure of domestic financial markets - the size, development and depth of 
domestic financial institutions and markets; 
"  growth dynamics - the domestic dynamics of investment, consumption and 
government expenditure in the economy.  
 
The diagram below presents a visual guidance to our discussion below. 
 






























Source: elaborated by the author. 
III.1. International financial environment and policy regime 
 
The  international financial environment (IFE hereafter) determines the freedom of 
capital flows between developed and developing economies.  In contrast to observed in 
the post-war period until the 1970s, financial development and internationalizaiton was 
significant in the 1980s and 1990s. The deregulation of capital accounts in both 
developed and developing economies allowed for a significant increase of the volume, a 
diversification of flows (especially in the direction of more portfolio flows) and more 
mobility (and volatility of these flows) (see e.g. Ocampo 1999). Given the pull factors 
(that is, risk-diversification by investors in mature economies), this opening allowed for a 
rapid expansion of financial integration. 
 
Given this IFE, the relative size of capital flows, vis-à-vis  the size of the economy 
matters in fundamental ways. Excessive capital flows (in relation to the needs to finance 
current account deficits) lead to excess supply of foreign reserves in the economy, which 
creates pressure either to revaluation of the domestic currency. This excess supply can be 
measured by the accumulation of reserves during a period of surge of capital inflows. 
This excess supply has consequences on the real (trade and output) as well as on the 
financial side (capital account and to the domestic financial markets) of developing 
economies, contingent on the policy regimes in place in the recipient economies. 
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The size of such flows vis-à-vis the size of host economies and of their domestic financial 
system determine their capacity of economies to absorb productively such flows. How 
such “excessive flows” were to affect the domestic economies was very much a result of 
the policy regimes adopted then.   
 
Policy regimes can be seen as the "filters" in the transmission mechanisms of surges of 
capital inflows. First, the capital account regime can partly restrict the volume and the 
type of flows allowed into the country. Second, exchange rate regimes determine how 
excessive flows of foreign capital are internalised: in a purely floating ERR, the impact of 
surges would only fall on the exchange rate, that is, the excess would be translated into 
exchange rate revaluation; whereas in fixed ERR, the surges will result in expansion of 
domestic liquidity, even if monetary authorities attempt to sterilize it (more on this 
below). Third, the trade regime will determine how the changes of exchange rate will 
affect the trade balance. Finally, monetary policy regimes determine whether domestic 
monetary authorities will be prepared to sterilize or not the additional liquidity created by 
a surge of capital flows. If the monetary authorities decide (or are capable
9) to sterilize, 
open market operations can maintain interest rates high. It is important to notice though 
that in that case this will create further incentives for continued capital inflows, as well a 
put pressure on fiscal balance (more on this below). 
 
There are obviously many combinations of the items above (IFE and policy regimes), so 
that for the sake of simplicity our theoretical discussion will be based on the characteristic 
policy and structural environments surrounding Latin American economies in the 1980s 
and 1990s (when the most recent surge of capital inflows started). 
 
Thus, for a significant number of the economies of the region, the policy regime adopted 
in the early 1990s was a mixture of highly liberal capital account and trade policies – 
with an important exception, that is Chile where some policies towards selective entry of 
capital were implemented. Exchange rate policies were used as anchors for price 
stabilization policies, whereas the monetary policy maintained the differentials between 
domestic and international interest rates high enough to continue attracting capital flows 
(and in special portfolio flows). Given the characteristics of the IFE, the policy regimes 
and the structure of domestic financial systems in Latin American economies, we can go 
on to analyse the domestic financial channels of surges of capital flows into the region - 
as we mentioned, the center of our analysis in this paper. 
 
III.2. Domestic financial channels 
 
The shallowness of secondary asset markets in developing economies makes domestic 
asset markets very sensitive to abrupt changes in liquidity. Unlike what happened in the 
                                                 
9 In extreme case of fixed ERR, such as the Argentinean currency board, the option to sterilize is 
limited. In that case, constraining the expansion of liquidity will have to be placed on the 
domestic banks' capacity to expand credit, for instance through higher reserve requirements. 
Indeed this was the option taken in the early stages of the Brazilian stabilization plan in 1994.  
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US economy (as described above), the links between secondary and primary securities 
markets is weak, so that rapid expansion of the former does not lead necessarily to the 
expansion of the issues of securities. To the contrary, a rapid growth of the liquidity of 
these markets tend to become mainly speculative bubbles, which creates disincentives for 
both issuers and long-term investors to remain in the market.  
 
Further, in the context of rapid financial integration and exchange rate stability, the larger 
size and greater depth of securities markets in mature economies makes it more attractive 
for large corporations (exactly those that issue securities in developing economies) to 
issue abroad. Paradoxically, thus, surges of capital flows in the context of the “integration 
of uneven partners”  tends to exacerbate the speculative nature of securities markets, and 
to create barriers for the long term development of these markets in developing 
economies.  
 
A different logic applies to foreign direct investment in the 1990s: most FDI to 
developing economies has been associated with process of acquisitions of companies in 
the context of privatisation of public companies and banks. Of course these flows per se 
are only direct to changes of ownership of capital, and do not lead to expansion of 
aggregate demand. But they do tend to create rapid increases of share prices. 
 
Even though securities markets are small, and their impact can be reduced in affecting 
expenditure decisions, the burst of speculative bubbles can affect both key domestic 
financial players and expectations in the economy. In both cases, this can affect 
macroeconomic performance. 
 
Now, now let us consider flows generated by the domestic banks borrowing in the 
international market. Due to their balance-sheet structure, banks are usually suppliers of 
short-term credit. The shallowness of markets for long-term securities and the poor 
development of interbank deposits markets reduce their capacity to manage their 
liabilities in order to compensate for changes in their reserves. In these circumstances, 
banks tend to be very conservative: they tend to lend short, restrict lending to privileged 
agents (large corporations and governments) and maintain high spreads. The access to 
international markets provides banks with expanded sources of funding at low interest 
rates (vis-à-vis domestic markets) and longer maturities. As long as the exchange rate is 
perceived as stable (as was the case in most economies in the region in the early-1990s), it 
is microeconomically rational to borrow long abroad to lend short domestically. Such an 
increase of external funding increases the domestic competition for expansion of bank 
loans.  
 
How these surges will affect the macroeconomic performance of the domestic economy 
will, finally, depend on the inherited growth dynamics and the inherited vulnerability 
of domestic financial systems. This are our next topics. 
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III.2.a. Inherited growth dynamics 
 
The supply and maturities of loanable funds represent a constraint on the expenditure 
decision of different agents in the economy, being a more determined factor for some (for 
instance, consumers) than for other (e.g. firms and governments). Surges of financial 
flows tend to reduce these constraints, as the additional domestic liquidity, created by the 
domestic intermediation, pushes domestic intermediaries to expand their assets. But final 
distribution of these loanable funds depends on the dynamics of growth. 
 
In some East Asian economies, for instance, the surge of capital inflows was associated 
with expansion of investment (see e.g. Park, 1998). This is not at all surprising given that 
one of the characteristics of the region in the recent past was a sustained growth led by 
domestic investment and exports and government deficits and debts were relatively small 
in the early 1990s. 
 
In Latin America, in contrast, investment was depressed during the 1980s, whereas fiscal 
disequilibria were significant (more on this below). Given the macroeconomic 
uncertainties and the extent of competitive pressure put on investors, long-term 
expectations, and thus investment, tended to be highly depressed in the 1990s. As 
mentioned above, consumer credit in the region, due to the characteristics of the domestic 
financial structure mentioned below, is highly rationed. In contrast with investment, thus 
consumption responds rapidly to changes in the supply of credit. Thus in Latin America 
most of these surges are associated wit “over-consumption”, rather than “over-
investment”.  
 
In addition, given the same uncertainties and other characteristics of the financial sector, 
and as mentioned above, the intermediation spreads of even short term credit tend to be 
very high, whereas the private supply of long-term loanable funds is simply irrelevant. All 
these supply and demand factors in the credit market in Latin America, tends to create a 
significant causal relation between surges of financial flows, credit expansion and 
domestic consumption boom. These, in turn, affect financial stability, according to the 
inherited stage of financial fragility –, as we will discuss below. 
III.2.b. Inherited financial fragility 
  
First, some words on financial fragility in the context of specific financial structures. 
 
A market economy is characterized by the fact that some expenditures (for instance, the 
acquisition of durable goods) and long-term uncertain undertakings (fixed capital for 
instance) need to be financed via the issuance of short-term assets (such as bank deposits) 
or liquid marketable assets. This combination of uncertainty and maturity mismatching 
makes our economies inherently a financially fragile economy.  
 
Keynes (1936) rightly noticed that in an economy with developed financial asset markets 
the changes in expectation of players in financial markets, which can be significant in  
  12 
periods of uncertainty, could lead to significant changes in the demand for money and 
interest rates. This in Keynes view could not only create undesirable changes in relative 
prices of all other assets and goods, but also reduce productive entrepreneurs capacity to 
repay their debts. Other authors inter alia Minsky (e.g. 1982), based on Fisher’s (1933) 
early description of debt-deflation processes showed that if monetary authorities did not 




Both Keynes and Minsky based their views on a historically specific, anglo-saxon capital 
market-based financial system. The same rationale can be applied to bank-based systems, 
of the type observed in Latin American economies, with some caveats. First of all, it is 
bankers' expectations (much more than expectations of traders in securities markets), 
which are obvious at the centre of changes of supply of liquidity in bank-based systems. 
This is not the appropriate place to discuss a Keynesian approach to the banking firm,
11 
but it can be said is that, given these expectations banks will expand credit according to 
the supply of reserves available to them.  
 
According to the approach above, surges of capital flows will affect the financial fragility 
of a given economy according to the way liquidity is expanded in the process and how 
this expanded liquidity affects domestic financial flows - and this has a lot to do with the 
domestic financial structure. In general, though, periods of surges of capital flows are 
associated with improved expectations, both of international investors and domestic 
players, on the future macroeconomic performance of the economy.  
 
It is seemingly rational to assume that bankers' expectations also tend to improve in such 
a periods. So, not surprisingly, surges of foreign capital flows to Latin America are often 
associated with the expansion of domestic credit, higher leverage of domestic banks and 
higher levels of indebtedness by private and public agents. That is, such flows tend to 
increase domestic financial fragility – as defined above. Fragility does not mean 
instability: it takes abrupt changes of certain key variables – for instance, an economic 
downturn, an abrupt change of interest rates and/or of the exchange rates (if the a 
significant part of domestic liabilities are denominated in foreign currencies) – to turn 
financial fragility into financial instability.  
  
Given the characteristics of developing markets described above, the policy regimes 
adopted in Latin America in the 1980s, and the analysis made in the previous paragraph, 
                                                 
10 If such a process of debt-deflation becomes a self-filling prophecy, it will not be easily 
reversed by spontaneous means (Taylor and O’Connell, 1985). And it can create a path-
dependent process: bankruptcies are irreversible changes, and if their number is significant, 
potential output is reduced and growth perspectives are lower. Rational long-term investors 
would hold less confidence in such an economy, leading to lower investment and growth. The 
expectations that led to the debt-deflation process can become a long, persistent process of 
stagnation. 
 
11 On this see Keynes himself (1930, vol. I).  
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how did large surges of financial flows affect domestic macroeconomic performance and 
financial stability ? This is the theme of our last topic before the conclusion. 
 
IV.  Surges of foreign capital inflows, macroeconomic 
performance and financial stability 
 
IV.1. Types of flows 
 
As mentioned above, in the first half of the 1990s, there was a spectacular growth of financial 
markets in the developed economies. This growth was soon followed by a significant surge 
of capital flows to developing countries – which more than tripled from 1991 to 1995.  As 
indicated by the Table 3, these flows have only been a fraction of those between mature 
economies, but by all measures are signification vis-à-vis the size of developing economies 
and their domestic financial markets.
12  
Table 3 - Developing-country shares (percentages except where stated otherwise) 
 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
In global total private capital flows 11.8 12.4 12.6 12.8 12.4 13.2 14.4 9.9 7.6 7.6
In global capital market flows 9.7 9.4 9.4 9 9 9.8 10.8 6.2 4.7 5.5
In global FDI flows 22.3 27.4 29.5 35.2 32.3 34.9 36.5 25.9 18.9 15.9
In global output 19.8 19.2 19.7 20 20.7 22.1 23.2 21.6 21.7 22.5
In global trade 26.5 28.3 28.3 28.4 29.5 31.3 32.4 30.7 30.7 33.4
In global population 84.1 94.3 84.4 84.5 84.6 84.7 84.9 85 85.1 85.2
Memo items (billions of dollars)
Global capital market flows 794 850 1226 1501 1928 2403 2929 3033 3910 4324
Global FDI 160 172 226 256 331 377 473 683 982 1118
 
Source: World Bank (2001). 
 
The policy regimes in many Latin American economies had some distinctive features, but 
were also in a certain way "influenced" by the opportunity offered by such excessive 
flows.  After one decade of balance-of-payments constraints (and net negative resource 
transfers) leading to very poor macroeconomic performance and high inflation in Latin 
America, the surge of capital inflows cum trade liberalisation eased the external constraint 
                                                 
12 Even though country-specific features did affect the distribution of such flows between 
developing economies, the push factors, related to the changes in financial markets in developed 
economies, seem to be the most important factor in explaining such growth. This can be seen by 
the growth of flows to both Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC hereafter) in the 1980s and 
1990s, two regions known to have significant macroeconomic performances and that nonetheless 
had similar trends of capital flows in the 1990s.  
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for the expansion of domestic demand associated with expanding imports
13 (Table 4). In 
addition, given these exceptional external conditions, many economies in the region used 
some type of exchange-based price stabilisation programs, based on pegged exchange rate 
regimes and commercial liberalisation, which were effective in reducing inflation.
14 
 
IV.2. Macroeconomic performance 
 
Using the excessive capital inflows to stabilise prices and to grow had important costs in 
Latin America in the 1990s. First, in most of the growth dynamics was highly associated with 
consumption expansion (Chile being one of the very few exception).
15 In contrast, (i) 
domestic investment remained depressed; (ii) domestic output grew at a lower pace than 
aggregate demand; (iii) despite the growth of exports, the current account situation continued 
to deteriorate, due both to the pace of growth of imports and to the increasing external debt. 
In sum, whereas in the short-medium run external imbalances, and thus external financial 
dependency, continued to grow, whereas potential output was growing at pace that was lower 
than needed to solve the macroeconomic imbalances created in the process. 
                                                 
13 The surge of capital flows significantly surpassed the needs to finance both the current and the 
capital account, generating systematic accumulation of reserves in the region.  
14 This is not to deny that other measures were necessary to achieve rapid stabilization. In 
Argentina, for instance, the Plan de Convertibilidad, which led to the creation of a currency 
board system, was effective in breaking down the inflation dynamics mainly by dollarizing a 
significant part of spot transactions and forward contracts. In Brazil, with a long history of 
indexation, breaking up with the inflation dynamics also required a Monetary Reform 
(implemented in 1994), which had the role of dismantling the main mechanisms of indexation of 
the economy.  
15 Given the macroeconomic uncertainties and the extent of competitive pressure put on 
investors, long-term expectations, and thus investment, tended to be highly depressed in the 
1990s. As mentioned above, consumer credit in the region, due to the characteristics of the 
domestic financial structure mentioned below, is highly rationed. In contrast with investment, 
thus consumption responds rapidly to changes in the supply of credit. Thus in Latin America 
most of these surges are associated wit “over-consumption”, rather than “over-investment”.   
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Table 4 - Latin America: some key macroeconomic indicators 
 1991  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
% c ha n g es
G D P 3,8 3,3 3,9 5,3 1,1 3,6 5,4 2,1 0,4
Per cap i ta GDP 2,0 1,4 2,1 3,5 -0,6 1,9 3,7 0,5 -1,2
CPI a/ 199 414 877 333 25,8 18,2 10,4 10,3 9,6
Terms of trade 0,8 -0,6 -0,4 4,9 1,2 1,4 2,0 -5,8 0,4
%
 
Urban unemp loy ment ... 6,5 6,5 6,6 7,5 7,9 7,5 8,1 8,7
% o f  GDP b/
Bal ance of  Pay ments
T rade account 0,4 -1,2 -1,5 -1,7 -0,7 -0,5 -1,5 -2,7 -1,1
Current  account -1, 5 -2, 7 -3, 3 -3, 3 -2, 2 -2, 1 -3, 3 -4, 5 -3, 1
Cap ital and Fi nanci al   1,9 3,9 4,4 2,7 1,8 3,7 4,3 3,5 2,8
B O P 0,5 1,2 1,2 -0,6 -0,4 1,6 1,1 -0,9 -0,3
 
Total disimbursed exte 39,4 37,7 38,1 35,8 37,2 35,5 33,7 37,9 43,4
Source: UN-ECLAC based on official figures. .
a/ D ec-D ec.   b/ E stim ate d usin g  current p rice d ollars.  c/ inclu ding  errors and omissions.
   
As external dependency grew, so did the constraints on domestic policy.   
 
First, in order to maintain the attractiveness for international investors and domestic 
borrowers, in many economies monetary policies started targeting the maintenance of high 
interest differentials, whereas fiscal discipline was used as a tool for adding credibility for the 
stability of exchange rate regimes.
16 Thus, attracting capital flows became a crusade that 
often included policy package (beyond the exchange rate regime).  
 
Second, the combination of high levels of interest rates made the process of fiscal adjustment 
difficult and led to loss of international competitiveness of domestic corporations, low levels 
of economic activity and rising unemployment. Thirdly, increased integration of domestic 
financial markets with the international ones and the widening of dollar-denominated 
liabilities and assets: in a significant numbers of the countries, the process of policy-induced 
dollarization was a fact 
17- which has profound effects on financial stability as we will 
discuss next.  
 
IV.3. Financial fragility 
 
In several occasions in the past (but more obviously in the 1990s), surges of capital flows 
in Latin America were also associated with domestic financial crises (mainly of the 
banking sector). These crises in turn prompted policies not only to avoid systemic effects, 
                                                 
16 Of course, fiscal discipline was also required for assuring sustainable growth of aggregate 
demand and supply in a context of low inflation.  
17 There are four ways dollarization could be achieved. For a classification of types of 
dollarization see Studart (2001).   
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The reasons for these crises vary, but certainly there are some important explaining factor 
relating to four items. 
 
There was an rise of intermediation risks associated with exchange rate mismatching. Rapid 
financial integration led to overborrowing syndrome, to a rapid process of assets and 
liabilities dollarization and to volatile behaviour of prices of domestic securities and other 
real assets. The overborrowing syndrome
19  leads to increasing vulnerability of domestic 
borrowers to changes in international interest rates and exchange rates – a vulnerability that 
is related to the increasing exchange rate mismatching.  
 
In the region, such a process took different forms and depth, according to the characteristics 
of the policy package adopted – but it did happen in a significant number of economies. In 
Argentina, for instance, there was a rapid increase of dollar-denominated contracts 
(especially of financial contracts such as consumer and corporate loans) (Studart and 
Hermann, 2000). In contrast in Brazil, where law forbids contracts denominated in foreign 
exchange, asset dollarization took mainly the form of dollar-indexed government bonds.
20 
 
The domestic maturity mismatching increased, due to the way financial flows are internalised 
into the economies of the region. A significant part of these took the form of portfolio 
investment, foreign direct investment, issues of corporate and government bonds. But another 
significant part was intermediated by domestic banks to domestic consumers, which was due 
to two facts. First, as mentioned earlier, banks tend to be very short-termist in the region. 
Second, the expansion of the supply of loanable funds reached the region in a period of high 
macroeconomic uncertainty and low investment.  
 
 
The volatility of prices of domestic assets rose, whereas domestic primary markets 
shrank.  In the region, securities markets, when they exist at all, are quite small and affect 
only marginally (through the formation of expectations for instance) the macroeconomic 
performance.
21 However, one important result of the financial integration of the 1990s 
                                                 
18 This is an important topic for several reasons: first, such processes were often with fiscal costs 
that made the maintenance of fiscal discipline even tougher; second, because the restructuring of 
the banking system was normally associated with opening up the domestic financial sector to 
foreign investors; third, because these regulatory and supervisory changes are affecting the way 
banks and other financial institutions intermediate loanable funds in the economy - a factor that 
is important for long term growth perspectives of some of the economies. These topics go far 
beyond the scope of these papers, but see, for instance, Stallings and Studart (2001) for a 
discussion of theme. 
19 That is, the expansion of external debt in excess of the needs to finance current account 
deficits leading to accumulation of reserves in periods of surges of financial flows to the region. 
20For an analysis of the process of liability dollarization in the MERCOSUR region, see Studart 
and Hermmann (2000). 
21 An important exception is the Brazilian case, as is evidenced by Studart (2000).  
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was the shrinkage of primary markets, associated both with the delisting of large 
companies and their option to issue securities abroad (Dowers et al, 2000). This is likely 
to create further problems of investment finance, and thus growht in the long run. 
 
Exchange rate crises have become more frequent, often associated with rapid devaluation 
and/or interest rate hike.  In the context of high maturity and exchange rate mismatching 
and/or increased supply of credit, raising the domestic interest rates or devaluing 
exchange rates is a recipe for financial instability. And indeed there were many occasions 
when both had to be done in view of abrupt reversals of foreign capital flows. Indeed, in 
many economies of the region, banking crises were often associated with such reversals. 
IV.4.  Recent developments and a inheritance of the integration among 
uneven partners 
 
In the first half of the 1990s the combination of stable (and sometimes overvalued) exchange 
rates, commercial opening and financial opening, and fiscal discipline led to a virtuous circle 
leading where the rapid achievement of price stability and exchange rate overvaluation 
further attracted foreign capital inflows.  
 
The virtuosity of this circle proved however to be a double two-edged sword in the second 
half of the 1990s, a feature that was already signalled by the 1994 Mexican crisis and the 
Tequila contagion effect. From that experience, it was already clear that the macroeconomic 
the economies in the region were too much dependent on foreign financial inflows and thus 
on the moods of international financial investors. However, the prompt recovery of the flows 
to Latin American economies reduced the overall concerns, and very few voices were heard 
against the continuing process of external fragilization that was in course in the region. 
 
From the eruption of the East Asian crisis in 1998, the deterioration of the confidence of 
foreign investors was reflected in increasing country risk implicit in the need to maintain 
even higher levels of interest rates. This in turn led to the widening financial disequilibria in 
domestic public and private sectors, while the disequilibria of the trade and services accounts 
of the balance of payments persisted. 
 
Ultimately the growing emerging-market crisis hit the LAC region, beginning with the 
contagion of the East Asian financial crisis and culminated with the 1999 speculative 
attack on Brazil - an attack that led (initially) to a chaotic process of devaluation of the 
Brazilian Real. The pressures on Brazil ceded and the price and output effects were far 
less drastic than expected (by the most optimistic analysts). Nevertheless the devaluation 
of the Real brought a severe misalignment of exchange rates in some important partners 
of Brazil in the region, especially those in the MERCOSUL bloc. As occurred in East Asia, 
the pressures for competitive exchange devaluation became significant and further 
increased the policy constraints and challenges faced by the region now.  
 
A process of competitive devaluation per se can have drastic effects on domestic prices 
and output - as the experience in Europe in the 1970s-1980s and, more recently in East 
Asia indicate. In economies with low levels of domestic asset and liability dollarization,  
  18 
these effects tend to diminish with time, as real exchange levels are established around 
their equilibrium levels.  However, due to the degree of dollarization of domestic assets 
and liabilities in countries such as Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay - just to mention a 
few – devaluation tend to have further consequences to their domestic financial systems. 
And financial instability, as is well documented, tends to have long-term negative effects 
on macroeconomic performance.  
 
V. Concluding  remarks 
 
The nature and the transmission of surges of foreign financial flows seem to have become 
quite different since the 1980s. Financial globalization does not only mean an increase of 
financial flows between developed and developing economies, but also a deeper financial 
linkages between economic agents of these economies.  
 
If our reasoning is correct, this integration is inherently destabilizing due to the wide (and 
widening) differences between ffinancial markets in mature and developing economies. 
Domestic policies in developing countries can mitigate, but not avoid these destabilizing 
effects. At least four complementing strategies need to be implemented in order to avoid 
that surges of financial flows (and abrupt reversals of these flows) affect the 
macroeconomic performance and the financial stability in the region. 
 
First, a better International Financial Architecture (IFA) is badly needed. Most proposals 
in this areas focus on the need for improved transparency and information, better 
domestic and international regulation, increased provision of official liquidity in times of 
crises and more private sector involvement in preventing and resolving crises. Most of 
these proposals lead, at the end of the day, to the reduction of the incentives for abrupt 
shifts of capital flows and the mitigation of their effects on developing economies, and to 
incentives towards increased flows of productive capital into the latter.
22 
 
Second, until such a more stabilizing IFA is not built, Latin American economies should 
be able to "shelter" their economies from destabilizing effects of short-term volatile 
capital inflows. The major problem about imposing capital controls is that if this is a 
long-term policy it tends to affect flows of productive capital (FDI) (on this see Ocampo, 
1999). In this sense, this policy cannot be but a medium term one, in order to buy time for 
the development of mechanisms which make such short-term capital less harmful and 
even less necessary (on the need of capital controls, see inter alia, Ffrench-Davis, 1999 
and Griffith-Jones & Kimmis, J., 1998).  
 
Third, even if the conditions above are met, given the size and volatility of international 
financial flows, the maintenance of an autonomous monetary policy can be more of an 
                                                 
22 Detailed analysis and proposals concerning this new international financial architecture can be 
found  interalia in Ocampo (1999), United Nations Task Force (1999), Fischer (1999) and 
Griffith-Jones et al (1999).  
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asset than a liability. And in this case, a more flexible ERR is preferred to a less flexible 
one.  Choosing an ERR that permits active use of stabilizing monetary policy. If our 
analysis is correct, a stabilizing monetary policy is required in order to avoid financial 
instability and to provide lender-of-last resort facilities for domestic banking system. In 
addition, as shown above, an active monetary policy is required if the rate of growth of 
developing economies is to be greater that that of developed economies – a requirement 
that few economists would doubt. Choosing an ERR that inhibits and surrenders policy 
autonomy in this case may be both counterproductive in terms of avoiding financial 
stability and in terms of making growth potential effective. 
 
Finally, developing countries should make efforts in the long run to develop financial 
mechanisms to internally finance and fund production, consumption and investment. The 
question of financial development cannot be treated in this paper, much less in a 
conclusion.  We would report the reader to some recent literature on this issue, including 
the World Economic and Social Survey 1999 (United Nations, 1999) – which in addition 
to an updated bibliography on the theme has important policy conclusions. Studart (1999) 
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